基于演化博弈的中小物流企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)泄露管理研究

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中圖分類號：F276.3 文獻標志碼：A DOI： 10.13714/j.cnki.1002-3100.2025.14.006

Abstract： Inrecent years，China'seconomyhasexperiencedrapid growth，leadingtotheemergenceofalargenumberofsmaland medium-sizedteseAmogtallddistiserprsesesetesiestoerormaioe duetolimitationsinsecurityinvestmentsandtechnicalsupport，theseenterprisesfaceahighriskofdatabreaches.Inlightofthis，n evolutionary game model fordata breach managementhas benconstructed basedon evolutionarygametheory，which comprisesthe managementofsalland medusizedlogisticsnterprise，mplos，andgovementregulatorydepartments.Thispaprals the evolutionarystable strategiesamong the game participantsandsubsequentlyemploys MATLABsoftwareforsimulation.Theresults indicatethattheriskofemploysbingdiscoveredfordatabreachessignficantlyinfuenesthetrategicchoicesofenterprises.Atte sametime，reasoablepunishmentmeasuescanefectivelygdeemploys toactivelysfeguardthedataseurityoflogsticseerises. Key words： smalland medium-sized logistics enterprises; data security; evolutionary game theory

1研究背景

隨著全球經(jīng)濟一體化及電子商務(wù)和新零售的發(fā)展，社會物流需求不斷增加。（剩余4266字）