基于EPR的動力電池回收演化博弈分析

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中圖分類號：F201 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)志碼：A DOI： 10.13714/j.cnki.1002-3100.2025.08.013

Abstract：BasedonthefactthatthestandardizedrecoveryrateofalargenumberofusedpowerbateriesislowinChinafirstlythe interestsbetweenNGOandautomobilemanufacturersareconsideredandthedualsupervisionofNGOtoautomobilemanufacturers is consideredtouildariartiteevoutioarygemodelecondlythpaprumericallsimuatestecostoftheiitialintetioof supervisionwithNGandthedegreeofrewardadpunishmenttotheenterprsetoexplorehowtheseactorsaectthestrategicchice of the game participants.ItisfoundthatstrengtheningtheinitialregulatorywillingnesswithNGOwillelpencourageautoobile manufacturerstotaketheinitiatietoecyclediscardedpowerbateries，thatenautomobilemanufacturerstendtorecyleasively appropriatesubsidiesorincreasedpenaltiescanactivelyrecyleautomobilemanufacturers，thatthparticipationofNGOcarevese supervisethe probabiltyofparticipationthroughpublicityandthatinthestandardizedrecyclingofwaste powerbateries，thejoint supervision is better than the single supervision.

KeyWords： producer responsibility system; power battery; evolutionary game; common monitoring

0引言

動力電池的規(guī)范化回收不僅有利于促進循環(huán)經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展和生態(tài)文明的建設(shè)，還影響著新能源汽車是否能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展。（剩余8082字）