稅收競爭與地方政府公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)自風(fēng)險承擔(dān)

——來自長江流域城市群PPP項(xiàng)目的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)

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中圖分類號：F283；F812.42 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識碼：A 文章編號：1007-5097（2025）07-0117-12

Tax Competition and Local Government Risk-Taking in Public Infrastructure Projects： Empirical Evidence from PPP Projects in Urban Agglomerations Along the Yangtze Rivel

DAI Chuanli'，YANG Tong2， CHEN Yunkang2，LI Xinyu （1.Decision Consulting Department，Party Schoolof Anhui Provincial Commitee of the Communist Party of China （Anhui Academy of Governance）， Hefei 23oo22， China; 2.SchoolofFinanceandPublicAdministration，Anhui UniversityofFinanceand Economics，Bengbu 233030，China; 3.School of Economics，Shanghai University，Shanghai 2OO444， China）

Abstract：This essysystematicallyassesses the impact of taxcompetition onlocal governments'risk-taking in public infrastructure projects，using PPPprojets from97cities along theYangtzeRiver between 2O15and 2022asresearch samples.The findingsreveal thattax competition significantlysuppresses local governments’risk-taking in public infrastructure projects，aconclusionthatremainsrobust afteraseriesof tests.Heterogeneityanalysis indicates hat the inhibitory efectof taxcompetition is more pronouncedinupstreamandriversideregions of theYangtzeRiver，andthat it imposesstrictercontrol onrisk-taking in economic projectscompared to social projects.Moderating efectanalysis demonstratesthatfiscal decentralization weakenstheinhibitory effectof taxcompetition，while market openness strengthensit.Theresearch provides policy implications for local governments to scientificallyalocate fiscal responsibilities in public infrastructure projects.

eywords：tax competition;public infrastructure projects; risk-taking; fiscaldecentralization;marketopenness

一、引言及文獻(xiàn)綜述

統(tǒng)籌好發(fā)展和安全是全面建設(shè)社會主義現(xiàn)代化國家必須面對的重大理論與實(shí)踐問題。（剩余17964字）